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Abstract
The ability to interpret the mental state of another agent based on its behavior, also
called Theory of Mind (ToM), is crucial for humans in any kind of social interaction. Artifi-
cial systems, such as intelligent assistants, would also greatly benefit from such mentalizing
capabilities. However, humans and systems alike are bound by limitations in their avail-
able computational resources. This raises the need for satisficing mentalizing, reconciling
accuracy and efficiency in mental state inference that is good enough for a given situation.
In this paper, we present different Bayesian models of ToM reasoning and evaluate them
based on actual human behavior data that were generated under different kinds of uncer-
tainties. We propose a Switching approach that combines specialized models, embodying
simplifying presumptions, in order to achieve a more statisficing mentalizing compared to
a Full Bayesian ToM model. 1
1. Introduction
Artificial systems are becoming increasingly widespread in our everyday lives and interact
with us in various contexts. They provide information or media entertainment via spoken
language interaction in home environments, assist in driving or navigating in traffic, or col-
laborate during manufacturing tasks. In all of these scenarios, one prerequisite for artificial
systems to effectively provide support to their users is a capability of “understanding” human
action and interaction, at least to a certain extent.
Humans have a remarkable ability to infer hidden information about another one’s ac-
tions such as desires, potentially false beliefs, preferences, and even emotions, only from
observing their behavior (Wellman & Liu, 2004). This ability is famously called "Theory
of Mind" (ToM) (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). For example, if we see somebody walking
towards the office kitchen with a mug in her hand, we can quite confidently infer that she is
looking for a new coffee and that she believes that there is coffee to be found in the kitchen.
This will also hold if we know that the coffee just run out, because we are able to attribute
beliefs that differ from our own knowledge. This "mentalizing" ability is assumed to develop
gradually as we grow up, with the inference of another one’s desires coming first before we
are able to infer more complex mental states such as (false) beliefs, preferences, and even
emotions (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Generally, children are assumed to have developed their
all of their ToM abilities, albeit not necessarily to the fullest extend, by the age of 6 (Flavell,
1999; Moran, 2013). At that point, children can not only infer another agent’s potentially
1. This paper is an extended version of (Pöppel & Kopp, 2018).
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false belief, but also employ recursive reasoning about what the other thinks about oneself or
what oneself might think about them (Grueneisen, Wyman, & Tomasello, 2015). Our ToM
capabilities help us in all our social interactions, from learning more about our environment
when observing others interacting with it, over allowing us better cooperation, by taking
our partner’s perspective into account, to being able to trick or deceive others gaining us an
advantage in competitive settings.
While humans often use their mentalizing abilities subconsciously, they do not always
employ them to their fullest extend (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). de Weerd, Verbrugge, and
Verheij (2015) have shown that we usually only employ first or second order ToM reasoning
in certain situations, even though we are capable of up to the sixth or seventh order.
A prominent example for this are egocentric tendencies found in communication (Keysar,
2007). Keysar (2007) showed that people often do not correctly take their communication
partner’s perspective into account, but rather project their own egocentric views onto them.
They contribute this lack of perspective taking at least in part to working memory limita-
tions, highlighting that mentalizing of more complex mental states is demanding even for
adults.
In fact, it has long been argued that humans are not capable of objective rationality, but
can only follow a bounded rationality (Simon, 1955; Aumann, 1997) due to the limitations
of our own (physical and mental) capabilities. Due to these limitations we are usually
employing different kinds of heuristics to solve inference and decision making tasks. Simon
(1955) argued that humans strife to be satisficing, meaning that we usually choose options
that are good enough to satisfy a given need instead of actually evaluating all possible options
in order to choose the objectively best one.
The most prominent approach in recent years to model ToM for artificial systems has
been the Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) framework by Baker, Saxe, and Tenenbaum
(2009), Baker, Jara-Ettinger, Saxe, and Tenenbaum (2017) which formalizes an inverse plan-
ning approach into a Bayesian framework. Within the BToM framework an agent’s behavior
is modeled by a generative probabilistic model specifying how observable actions are caused
by hidden mental states such as desires and/or beliefs. Using Bayes’ rule, one can invert
these models to infer likely mental states based on observations. While this approach has
been shown to make inferences correlating well with human judgments in a range of different
scenarios (Ullman, Tomer, Baker, Macindoe, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2009; Jern, Lucas,
& Kemp, 2017; Velez-Ginorio, Siegel, Tenenbaum, & Jara-Ettinger, 2017), its key problem
is that Bayesian reasoning becomes prohibitively expensive for complex models, resulting in
fine-tuned systems specialized to infer mental states in very specific situations.
We argue for the need to consider satisficing mentalizing for artificial systems in this
paper. Contrary to most previous work on BToM models, we evaluate different models fol-
lowing the Bayesian Theory of Mind framework on actual human behavior data generated
under different mental conditions with respect to their predictive accuracy as well as their
computational efficiency. We chose to evaluate the model’s predictive accuracy of human
behavior in a ToM setting primarily for two reasons: Firstly, previous research has already
shown that the BToM framework is able to infer mental states that correlate well with
inferences made by humans when considering handcrafted stimuli. For this work, we there-
fore assume that the choice of BToM models is appropriate for inferring mental states from
behavior. However it has not been evaluated on actual, potentially noise, human behavior
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data. Secondly, we believe that, at least for the domain chosen in this work, one cannot
make good predictions regarding an agent’s future actions without a sufficiently accurate
account of said agent’s mental state, as different mental state assumptions will lead to very
different action predictions. For these reasons, we believe the predictive accuracy to be a
good metric for the quality of the mental state inference for our models. We further propose
a Switching strategy as a possible way towards satisficing mentalizing within the Bayesian
Theory of Mind framework. By only making use of more complex models when simpler
models no longer suffice, we explore how an artificial system can make use of these different
heuristics in order to perform mental reasoning good enough, similar to humans.
To collect the behavioral data we performed an online study in which participants had to
navigate a 2D gridworld while manipulating the information available to them, thus inducing
different uncertainties. We argue that these different conditions influenced the decision mak-
ing process of our participants in distinct ways, resulting in the need for different specialized
BToM models to best explain the observable behavior. We will show that an alternative Full
BToM model, which tries to model all possible mental states concurrently, quickly becomes
prohibitively expensive to evaluate (exactly) while not necessarily performing accurately.
Instead we propose to switch between different specialized models (or heuristics if you will),
which not only reduces the computational costs, but also shows superior predictive accu-
racy, potentially bringing it closer to the satisficing mentalizing resulting from the bounded
rationality in humans.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: First we will give a brief summary
of the relevant literature regarding mentalizing for action understanding using the BToM
framework as well as relevant findings in Cognitive Science. Afterwards we will present the
aforementioned navigation scenario as well as the different conditions we employed there in
order to induce behavior under different kinds of uncertainty. We will present the data we
collected and discuss the different behavior patterns we observed. In section 5 we intro-
duce the different computational models for action understanding formally before discussing
results of their application and comparison on the original study data.
2. Related Work
There has been a lot of research on both bounded rationality as well as different approaches
to action understanding and intention or plan recognition across a range of different domains.
We will review some of the relevant findings in the following.
2.1 Classical Approaches to Behavior Understanding
Action, intention and plan recognition has been studied extensively in autonomous robots
that need to be able to interpret the behavior of agents around them in order to function
better but also in communication where an interlocutors intention was of interest. From
there other domains such as entertainment and education have also come into the focus of
researchers.
Bosse, Memon, and Treur (2007) proposed a two-level Belief, Desire, Intention (BDI)
(Rao & Georgeff, 1995) model for artificial agents. In this way, the classical BDI framework is
used to create an agent that reasons about the mentalizing process of another agent, therefore
performs Theory of Mind. This approach shares the classical benefits and limitations of the
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BDI framework: It provides well defined models that can be tailored to specific situations,
which however is simultaneously its biggest weakness since the rules it follows need to be
handcrafted and are usually not flexible enough to deal with variations in the scenario.
An early probabilistic approach to plan recognition has been proposed in (Charniak
& Goldman, 1993). The authors stress the importance of a probabilistic consideration
compared to the classical logic-based approaches and present rules for translating a plan
recognition problem into a Bayesian network. Albrecht, Zukerman, and Nicholson (1998)
also used Dynamic Bayesian Networks in order to perform plan recognition in an adventure
game. Multiple Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are used in Han and Veloso (2000) in order
to model robot behavior. Similar to our proposed switching approach, their recognition
algorithm makes use of specialized models (HMMs in their case), each designed for a specific
behavior. However, similar to word recognition and unlike our approach, all HMMs need
to be evaluated for every new observation in order to figure out which HMMs accept the
observations.
Pynadath and Marsella (2005) developed “PsychSim, an implemented multiagent-based
simulation tool for modeling interactions and influence” (p. 1) to simulate school violence
and bullying. PsychSim directly models beliefs about other agents using a POMDP where
each agent does not only hold beliefs about the world, but also about the beliefs and assumed
preferences of other agents. However, in order to save computational resources, Pynadath
and Marsella (2005) do not model deeper recursive believes as in agent A believes that
agent B beliefs that agent A knows X. Conceptually, PsychSim has many similarities to the
Bayesian Theory of Mind framework, as it formalizes the belief dynamics in a probabilistic
framework (the POMDP). However in its presented state, it only allows for forward simula-
tion of agents that take other agents into account. It has not been used to infer the mental
states of other agents based on their behavior.
An interesting intention-focused approach uses force dynamics to model the interaction
between multiple agents that take each other into account (Crick & Scassellati, 2010). Their
system is able to infer relationships between the different agents, such as that one chases
the other, as well as to learn how its own actions influence the environment. While their
approach does not directly model more complex mental states such as beliefs, it can be
seen as an example that simpler systems, relying on rudimentary sensory information, can
achieve very sophisticated behavior.
Recently, Rabinowitz, Perbet, Song, Zhang, Eslami, and Botvinick (2018) present a
ToM model based on deep learning. They combine deep neural networks trained to embed
observable behavior of an agent navigating a maze into a low dimensional space which should
represent the mental state of that agent. They are then able to predict the agent’s next
actions from this mental state as well as an agent-specific character embedding using a
prediction network. While they cannot describe the observed agent’s mental state clearly,
they consistently find structure within the embedding space which can be related to certain
mental states. However, at this point this system still requires a large amount of synthetic
training data from artificial agents, which makes it currently unusable for the use with
human behavior.
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2.2 Bayesian Theory of Mind
The Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) framework proposed by Baker, Saxe, and Tenen-
baum (2011) can be seen as a special case of inverse planning (Baker, Tenenbaum, & Saxe,
2007; Baker et al., 2009). The premise that allows one to infer correct mental states from
observations despite the infinite number of possible explanations is the principle of rational-
ity, i.e. the assumption that rational agents behave optimally (Dennett, 1989). Under this
assumption, one can assume that an agent’s behavior maximizes its utility. By inverting the
planning problem we can thus infer an agent’s goals or intentions in the form of its utility
function. The BToM framework directly encodes beliefs or other mental states as probabil-
ity distributions (Baker et al., 2011). Their work has been greatly inspired by the nested
belief representation and inference for multi-agent environments in (Zettlemoyer, Milch, &
Kaelbling, 2009).
Informally, the BToM framework can be described as follows: By defining a generative
model which relates mental states such as intentions and beliefs to actual actions, e.g. as
a (partially observable) Markov Decision Problem (POMDP), an agent’s actions can be
predicted, given these mental states. Bayes’ rule allows us to invert this model in order to
infer these mental states from observations:
P (M |Actions,Environment) ∝ P (Actions|M,Environment)P (M |Environment) (1)
with M standing for our considered mental states (slightly adapted from (Baker et al.,
2009)). This general approach, not always under the name of BToM, has been used success-
fully in a range of different scenarios, such as navigation (Baker et al., 2017), compositional
desires (Velez-Ginorio et al., 2017), social interactions (Ullman, Tomer et al., 2009) or infer-
ring people’s preferences (Jern et al., 2017). The success of these models has usually been
determined by running studies that collect human ratings on the mental states of interest in
a range of generated stimuli and computing the correlation between these human ratings and
the models’ predictions. While these works have shown that the proposed models can make
inferences similar to humans in those situations, these models were designed specifically
for those scenarios with their parameters often fit to maximize correlation. Past research
has not explored how well these models perform with a given set of parameters when the
situation they are considering changes or certain assumptions are violated.
2.3 Rational Reasoning Under Constrained Resources
The notion of rationality has long been studied from many different perspectives.
Simon (1955) was among the first to systematically cover the discrepancy between ob-
jective rationality and rationality with respect to the limitations of a living organism.
These constraints include purely physical ones, such as the speed at which we can move,
but also cognitive limitations, such as the size of our working memory. Simon (1955) ar-
gues that all these constraints, external as well as internal, need to be kept in mind when
considering rationality and that humans can only ever achieve bounded rationality.
Since then, there has been an increasing amount of work regarding this notion of bounded
rationality, especially in the Cognitive Science community, with a special focus on discovering
these limitations in greater detail. For those interested, a review regarding multiple cases
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of bounded rationality in humans can be found in (Jones, 1999). Furthermore, Haselton,
Nettle, and Murray (2015) argue how many biases now attributed to bounded rationality
may have evolved in order to improve our overall fitness.
A very recent framework trying to formalize bounded rationality for the general case has
been proposed by Lieder and Griffiths (2019) with their “Resource-rational analysis”. They
formalize how humans may still maximize their expected utility, i.e. behave rationally,
while being restricted by limited (computational) resources. A result of their framework is
actually the emergence and solidification of heuristics, as applying (learned) heuristics will
usually yield good results with comparatively little computational costs. This is in line with
the switching approach we are proposing in this paper, as it also makes use of given (e.g.
previously learned) heuristics in the form of simplified models but still selects which one to
choose.
When considering the BToM framework, one also quickly recognises the need for more
satisficing solutions that take resource constraints into account. As Baker et al. (2009)
already stated in their early work on the BToM framework: “..,the inverse problem is ill-
posed. Its solution requires strong prior knowledge of the structure and content of agents’
mental states, and the ability to search over and evaluate a potentially very large space of
possible mental state interpretations.” (p. 330)
While the strong prior knowledge requirement might potentially be mitigated some-
what using hierarchical learning approaches (e.g. (Diaconescu, Mathys, Weber, Daunizeau,
Kasper, Lomakina, Fehr, & Stephan, 2014)) in the future, the “ability to search over and
evaluate a potentially very large space..” is a mayor challenge for Bayesian methods in
general. Especially the normalization required in Bayes’ rule forces one to integrate over all
possible mental states, which quickly becomes intractable. Previously, this usually resulted
in the consideration of only a small mental state space, coarse discretization of continuous
spaces and/or the use of different approximations, most notably sampling algorithms. Sam-
pling in particular has become prominent not only because of its manageable computational
requirements but also because there is some evidence that humans’ deviations from optimal
Bayesian reasoning, i.e. fallacies such as the base-rate neglect (Sanborn & Chater, 2016),
may be explained by considering human reasoning as approximate inference with a limited
number of samples (Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2014).
Due to both of these reasons, the need for specialized models and the challenges with
efficient inference, have so far made it difficult to employ BToM models in live systems that
try to infer a user’s mental state in real-time. Our proposed Switching approach should be
considered as one additional possible way of enabling statisficing ToM models for artificial
systems.
3. Scenario: Navigating a Maze with Different Uncertainties
In order to be able to evaluate different models in situations where different mental states
should be considered on actual human behavior data, we first needed to collect such data.
The scenario we chose needed to be easy to understand for participants and simple enough
to allow exact inference in our models, as we did not want to have our results influenced by
approximate inference methods. Furthermore, the scenario needed to allow us to influence
the mental states of participants. Due to these reasons we chose a navigation task in a
6
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Figure 1: The different mazes (ordered 1-6 from top left to bottom right). Colored squares
represent potential exits and the smiley represents the agent to be navigated by participants,
here shown in its starting position.
2D maze like environment where we influenced the amount of information provided to the
participants in different conditions.
We chose such a “gridworld” environment because its discrete nature allows us to perform
exact inference. On top of that, we can easily manipulate the amount of information we
provide to participants and lastly, we reason that navigating an agent through simple envi-
ronments is fairly intuitive to most participants. We designed six different mazes of varying
complexity which can be seen in Figure 1. Each maze has four potential exits, differing by
their color and corresponding symbol, (R)ed, (Blue), (Yellow) and (O)range. For each maze
we further introduced a second variation, where we changed the agent’s starting position
and/or the exit locations. An example of the two different variants of Maze 1 can be seen
in Figure 2.
Similar gridworlds have also been successfully used in previous research using the BToM
framework, such as (Baker et al., 2009), however in these cases the behavior that is later
used as stimuli for their models and participants is usually handcrafted.
3.1 Conditions and respective Uncertainties
In order to gather behavior data produced by different mental states we modified the amount
of information available to participants. That is, we induced different amounts of uncer-
tainty, which in turn can be interpreted as resulting in different mental states. We used
three different conditions differing in how the mazes were presented to participants as shown
in Figure 3 for Maze 6.
No Uncertainty The first condition (leftmost image in Figure 3) was termed No Uncer-
tainty (NU). In this condition, we removed all sources of uncertainty with respect to the
navigation task by showing the entire maze with one exit to the participants. The exit is
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Figure 2: The two variants of Maze 1 used in the study. The smiley indicates the respective
starting positions.
Figure 3: The three conditions No Uncertainty, Destination Uncertainty and Path Uncer-
tainty, respectively, from a participant’s perspective, here for Maze 6.
initially only shown in a generic green color. Its actual color is only revealed once a line of
sight is established (compare with the middle image in Figure 3 of the Destination Uncer-
tainty condition). As such we assume participants in this condition should hold a correct
and true belief regarding the structure of the maze as well as their belief about where the
exit they are supposed to reach, i.e. their goal, is located.
Destination Uncertainty In the second condition, termedDestination Uncertainty (DU),
we again show the entire maze, but this time include all four potential exits, each hiding
their actual color/identity unless a line of sight is established between the exit and the agent
(see center image in Figure 3). Participants may know the color of the desired exit, but
were uncertain about which exit had which color initially. Unlike in the first condition,
participants could not have a certain a belief about the location of the desired exit in this
case.
Path Uncertainty The third condition, called Path Uncertainty (PU), introduces un-
certainty in the belief or knowledge regarding the structure of the maze. In this condition
participants got to see only a single exit, similar to the first condition, however, we only
revealed up to three blocks around the agent, thus hiding the rest of the maze (see rightmost
image in Figure 3). That way participants could not be certain regarding the paths leading
towards the exit.
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4. Collection of Empirical Behavior Data
In order to collect human behavior data generated by different mental states, we conducted
an online study using the Crowdflower platform (now re-branded as figure-eight2). We
recruited 122 participants via this service, which were asked to complete our web-based
survey in which they had to navigate through all six mazes, after which they received 0.2e.
Out of the 122 participants, only 110 completed all six mazes. The remaining 12 stopped
after 1 to 5 mazes.
In total we collected 687 complete behavior trajectories that reached to the actual exit
within the different maps and conditions as shown in Table 1.
4.1 Procedure
All participants were asked to navigate all six mazes with each condition appearing twice.
Which maze was presented in which condition (and variant) was randomly assigned to the
participants, only ensuring that each participant encountered each maze only once and each
condition twice.
Participants were initially instructed that they would need to navigate a number of
small mazes to reach a specific exit. Participants were then shown the maze, informed that
they could control the agent in the four cardinal directions either using their keyboard or
the buttons located around the maze and were given a condition-specific task instruction:
In the No Uncertainty condition participants were told “Reach the shown exit.”. In the
Destination Uncertainty condition the instructions read “Find the <color> (<colorsymbol>)
exit.”, where the color of the actual target and its symbol as rendered on the maze ((R)ed,
(B)lue, (O)range or (Y)ellow) was inserted accordingly. Finally, in the Path Uncertainty
condition participants were told “Find your way to the shown exit.”
We also told participants that they needed to specifically “enter” (either using the E or
the Return key on their keyboard or the corresponding button on the website) the exit in
order to complete a maze. Using enter on any tile other than the correct exit did nothing.
The instructions were initially shown in an overlay on top of the maze, which participants
had to dismiss by pressing a key. Furthermore, the task description as well as all control
instructions were always present beneath the maze so that participants could consult them
as needed.
As soon as a participant finished a maze, the next maze would load and showing the
corresponding task instructions. After finishing all six mazes, participants were given a
password, which they could use to complete the survey on the Crowdflower platform.
4.2 Results
As we will use this behavior data for evaluating computational models (see Section 5), we
present here a brief summary of the data.
Completions Since we assigned conditions and variants randomly and since not all partic-
ipants completed all 6 mazes, we ended up with different numbers of completed trajectories
for each of the different variants. Table 1 summarizes these completed trajectories for all
mazes, conditions and variants.
2. https://www.figure-eight.com/
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NU DU PU
Maze V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2
1 23 22 16 21 14 18
2 18 22 18 21 14 21
3 15 23 18 20 16 22
4 12 20 13 18 25 28
5 17 19 15 25 16 21
6 17 22 20 22 7 28
Table 1: Breakdown of the 687 completed trajectories for the different mazes, conditions
and variants. NU, DU and PU are the different conditions No Uncertainty, Destination
Uncertainty and Path Uncertainty respectively, cf. Section 3.1
Optimal NU DU PU
Maze V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2
1 50 50 5.22% 4% 51.5% 44.76% 78% 20.67%
2 32 39 15.62% 4.2% 97.22% 108.91% 21.88% 49.57%
3 52 65 18.72% 8.03% 105.77% 90.36% 163.46% 77.62%
4 65 62 2.31% 7.58% 117.4% 153.58% 61.42% 63.82%
5 28 21 9.66% 5.51% 58.57% 98.29% 19.2% 14.06%
6 35 30 24.54% 21.52% 105.43% 144.24% 98.78% 73.57%
Table 2: Minimum number of steps required for the different mazes and their variants as
well as the percentage of the average increase in actual steps taken by the participants for
each of the different mazes, their variants and conditions.
We can see that most variants were completed somewhere between 15 and 28 times, with
a strong outlier being the first variant for the Path Uncertainty condition in maze 6, where
we unfortunately only got 7 valid trajectories.
Average path lengths Since we are assuming that our participants act like rational
agents, we expected them to solve the task of reaching their goal close to optimal. Table 2
presents the optimal number of steps required to reach the goal from the start position as
well as how many more steps participants required on average for the different conditions
and variants.
While the number of steps varies greatly between the different mazes, due to different
lengths of the required paths, we see a clear trend: As expected, participants were most
optimal in the No Uncertainty condition, where only a small number of unnecessary actions
were taken. Participants took substantially more steps in the Path Uncertainty condition
with the exception of both variants of Maze 5 and Variant 1 of Maze 2. All of these three
variants have in common that a greedy strategy towards the goal corresponds closely to
the optimal path. While not as clear, participants generally took the most steps in the
Destination Uncertainty condition, where they did not know about the location of their
goal.
10
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The differences in behavior between the three conditions can be seen more clearly if one
considers the percentage of trajectories that performed (close to) optimal, i.e. trajectories
where participants used (close to) the minimum number of steps to reach their goal. Note,
that rationally the different conditions would have different “optimal” behavior. Here, we
only consider optimality from the point of view of an oracle in order to highlight that the
different conditions successfully evoked different behavior. Figure 4 shows the percentages
across all mazes and variants for the three conditions, while distinguishing between optimal
trajectories and those that took 10% or 20% additional steps. We include these 10% and 20%
evaluations since with this we can still count participant that only overshot at an intersection
(see Figure 6 for examples) as behaving close to optimal as well3. The plot reveals clear
differences between the three conditions. While in the No Uncertainty condition over 83% of
trajectories were completed with a 20% margin around the optimal number of steps, in the
Destination Uncertainty condition less then 8% of participants took close to the minimum
number of steps, as one would expect, since participants needed to search for their goal
exit. The Path Uncertainty condition is in the middle, with close to 32% of trajectories
being completed near optimally. However, it is noteworthy that the fraction of trajectories
actually being completed optimally is a lot lower in the Path Uncertainty condition compared
to both other conditions. Furthermore, this fraction is a lot more dependent on the maze
compared to the Destination Uncertainty condition, as can be seen in Table 2 and as well
as the examples in the next section.
This general trend can be seen across all mazes, although there are differences between
the different mazes as well as even just variants of the same maze. A fairly extreme example
of differences between variants is Maze 2 as shown in Figure 5. While the general points still
hold, we see almost similar percentages of almost optimal behavior in the Path Uncertainty
condition as in the No Uncertainty condition for Variant 1. However, this chances in the
second variant, where not even half as many participants performed the task nearly optimal
in the Path Uncertainty condition.
Visualization of the different Behaviors In order to visualize the differences in be-
havior, Figure 6 shows aggregations from all trajectories of the No Uncertainty (Figure 6a),
Destination Uncertainty (Figure 6b) and Path Uncertainty (Figure 6c) conditions in Maze
2, Variant 2 (top row) and Maze 6, Variant 1 (bottom row). One can see clearly how most
people follow one of the possible optimal ways in the No Uncertainty condition (leftmost
images), while they are employing a nearest-next exploration strategy in the Destination
Uncertainty condition (images in the middle). The difference in behavior between the No
Uncertainty and Path Uncertainty conditions is less clear in Maze 2 (outer images in the top
row) than in Maze 6 (bottom row) as a greedy homing strategy, which participants usually
employed when they did not see the maze, is very close to the optimal trajectory in Maze
2. Only the number of participants overshooting the last 4-way intersection and exploring
the dead end pointing towards the red exit clearly hints at a difference in condition. On the
other hand, in Maze 6 the homing strategy leads participants towards the dead end, that
almost all participants run into in the Path Uncertainty condition.
3. Note that due to the nature of the mazes, any erroneous action will need to be corrected, meaning that
for each error, the participant will increase the number of steps taken by two.
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Figure 4: Percentage of trajectories that were (close to) optimal for the three different
uncertainty conditions. Optimal+10% and Optimal+20% refer to trajectories that used
10% or 20% more steps than the optimum respectively. All other trajectories with more
steps are collected under Other.
Optimal Optimal+10% Optimal+20% Other
Variant 1 NU DU PU
V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2
0
25%
50%
75%
100%
Variant 2
Figure 5: Center: Percentage of trajectories that were (close to) optimal for the three
different uncertainty (U) conditions. Optimal+10% and Optimal+20% refer to trajectories
that used 10% or 20% more steps than the optimum respectively for both variants of Maze
2. All other trajectories with more steps are collected under Other. In the first variant (left
image) the goal was the (B)lue exit, while it was the (R)ed exit in the second variant (right
image).
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(a) NU (b) DU (c) PU
Figure 6: Aggregation of all trajectories in Maze 2, Variant 2 for the top row (the goal was
the red exit) and maze 6, variant 1 for the bottom row (the goal was the yellow exit) as
black lines. Trajectories from the three conditions No Uncertainty, Destination Uncertainty
and Path Uncertainty are shown in (a), (b) and (c) respectively. Circle size and opacity
represents the relative number of times a cell was visited. The smiley represent the starting
position in each case.
5. Model Formulations
The previous section revealed mostly different behavior depending on the knowledge or the
amount of uncertainty participants are exposed to. Next, we want to test ToM models which
observe the generated data, try to infer the behaving agents’ underlying mental states and
use these to predict the agents’ future actions. To this end, we will define different Bayesian
models of ToM reasoning and compare them across these different situations. We will first
present a Full BToM model designed to take into account all three kinds of uncertainty.
We will then show how to simplify this model in order to end up with specialized models,
each geared to one of the conditions. Finally, we will describe a strategy for satisficing
mentalizing that switches between these specialized models.
5.1 The Full BToM model
The three conditions in our scenario control the amount of uncertainty within the partici-
pants. We model these uncertainties using two different kinds of (discretized) beliefs, which
we term world belief Bw and goal beliefs Bg.
Following the classical BToM framework, we need to define a generative model which
incorporates these two beliefs, along with an agent’s desire or goal to determine the agent’s
next action at+1:
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P (at+1|at) =
∑
g∈G
bg∈Bg
bw∈Bw
P (at+1|g, bg, bw,at)P (bw|at)P (bg|at)P (g|at) (2)
Here, at stands for the actions the agent performed in the previous t time steps. We use
G as the set of possible goals the agent may have as its desire, i.e. the exit it wants to reach.
The goal belief Bg determines where one assumes a particular exit (and thus one’s goal) to
be located out of the four possible positions. In this scenario, the 4 exits can be arranged in
a total of 24 different configurations. Following (Baker et al., 2011), we split our goal belief
Bg into 24 possibilities, each representing one of these configurations.
The world belief Bw represents the agent’s (believed) knowledge about the structure of
the maze, i.e. the location of walls. If we tried to tread Bw the same as Bg by considering
all possible configurations of walls, even in our simple 2D environment of size 13 by 20,
we would need to consider 213∗20 = 1.85 × 1078 different configurations. Even if one would
a-priori select only worlds with reachable exits, one still ends up with an intractable number
of possibilities. Since we do not seem it likely that humans are considering all potential wall
placements either, we will employ a first heuristic for the Full BToM model, the freespace
assumption. The freespace assumption, commonly used in the robotic planning literature,
e.g. (Koenig & Smirnov, 1997; Zelinsky, 1992), assumes that unknown cells are actually
free, i.e. there is no wall and it is passable. Using the freespace assumption, we model Bw
as a binary variable, either the agent has a true belief regarding the maze’s structure or the
agent does not know anything about the maze until it was within its vision range and the
agent uses the freespace assumption when considering distances.
The likelihood P (at+1|g, bg, bw,at) is modeled similar to earlier ToM models, as that it
models human actions according to the Boltzmann noisy rationality:
P (at+1|g, bg, bw) = exp(βU(at+1, bg, bw, g))∑
ai∈A exp(βU(ai, bg, bw, g))
(3)
Here β determines the degree of rationality. Higher values increase the probability to
choose the action at+1 with the highest utility U(at+1, bg, bw, g), whereas a values of β = 0
would result in a uniform distribution across all possible actions. The utility U determines
how beneficial the different actions are given the beliefs and the agent’s goal. It follows from
solving the Markov Decision Problem. By assuming equal costs for all actions, the utilities
turn out to be equivalent to the remaining distance after executing action at+1 towards
the exit determined by goal g and the goal belief bg using either the true distance or the
freespace assumption depending on bw.
P (bw|at), P (bg|at) and P (g|at) are the prior probabilities for the world belief, the goal
belief and the goal intention respectively. These are initially assumed to be uniform. We
simply use Bayes’ rule to update P (g|at) and P (bw|at) (compare the general BToM idea in
1):
P (g|at) ∝ P (at|g)P (g) (4)
(5)
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and
P (bw|at) ∝ P (at|bw)P (bw) (6)
(7)
with prior probabilities P (g) and P (bw). Note that these can also be computed incre-
mentally, e.g. for the goal intention:
P (g|at) ∝ P (at|g)P (g|at−1) (8)
However, we update our goal beliefs similar to (Baker et al., 2011) by using an update
rule based on observations:
P (bg|at) ∝ P (ot|st, bg)P (bg|at) (9)
Here we define P (ot|st, bg)4 to be the probability of actually observing ot at time t given
the agent’s current state st and goal belief bg. Since the goal belief only influences the
believed exit locations, we compare if the assumed exit is visible from the agent’s current
position given its state. By assigning matches between the assumed and the actual observa-
tions the probability θ, we can model noise sensors as well. However, in this work we do not
focus on imperfect information, which is why we set θ to 1 for the results reported below.
Note that when no exit is visible from the agent’s current position the observation matches
the assumption.
5.2 Specialized Models Based on Discrete Assumptions
In contrast to the Full BToM model described above, we can also define specialized BToM
models each tailored for the induced mental states in the three conditions we are considering
here. Since the conditions only differ in the amount of uncertainty they introduce, the spe-
cialized models can actually be understood as making different kinds of discrete assumptions
about the different belief states in the form of true beliefs within the full model:
The first model, corresponding to the No Uncertainty condition is termed True World
and Goal (TWG) model, as we are assuming a true belief regarding both the layout of the
maze as well as the actual colors of the exits, i.e. the agent’s goal:
Ptwg(at+1|at) =
∑
g∈G
P (at+1|g, b∗g, b∗w)P (g|at) (10)
where b∗g and b∗w stand for the true goal belief and the true world belief respectively. By
making these discrete assumptions, the model simplifies greatly compared to the full model
in Equation 2, as we do not need to consider all combinations of possible beliefs anymore.
Consequently, the model specialized for the Destination Uncertainty condition, named
True World (TW) model hereafter, only makes the true belief assumption for the world
belief:
4. This is independent of the world belief bw as only visible exits are considered.
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Ptw(at+1|at) =
∑
g∈G
bg∈Bg
P (at+1|g, bg, b∗w)P (bg|at)P (g|at) (11)
Finally, the model for the Path Uncertainty condition, called True Goal (TG) model
only makes this assumption for the goal belief:
Ptg(at+1|at) =
∑
g∈G
bw∈Bw
P (at+1|g, b∗g, bw)P (bw|at)P (g|at) (12)
Due to our simplification with regard to the freespace assumption, Equation 12 simplifies
further if we want to make it match the Path Uncertainty condition, since in this case we will
assume b′w as following the freespace assumption instead of considering both possibilities:
Ptg(at+1|at) =
∑
g∈G
P (at+1|g, b∗g, b′w)P (g|at) (13)
These specialized models represent only those uncertainties that were induced by the
different conditions. As such we expect them to be quite good at inferring the induced
mental states from their corresponding conditions, while being worse when inferring behavior
generated in one of the other two conditions.
5.3 Switching Strategy
In order to leverage both the computational (and predictive) benefits of the specialized
models as well as the flexibility to be able to deal with different scenarios, we propose here
a very simple switching strategy, which will autonomously choose the specialized models
which it deems most promising.
This strategy will effectively start with the simplest and most efficient TWG model,
basically exhibiting a strong egocentric tendency by projecting the observer’s true belief
onto the agent. Each observable action the agent performs is then evaluated with regard to
how well it matches the current model’s prediction. We consider unmatched observations
as surprising, with the degree of surprise depending on how unexpected the observations
are. The choice of matching function will change the behavior of the approach and different
possibilities exist. In this paper we consider two different surprise measurements as matching
function, which will be presented in Section 5.4. If the observed behavior deviates too
strongly, i.e. exceeds a dynamic threshold γ, from what the current model would expect,
the switching model re-evaluates its current model choice and adapts the threshold. In our
first naive approach, this re-evaluation simply evaluates the past behavior of the this agent
with all available models and switches to the one that can explain the behavior best. Note
that the approach may stick with the current model in case no other model can outperform
it. In order to avoid constant re-evaluations, the threshold γ is increased by 50% each time
the model reconsiders. This will effectively make the Switching approach more tolerant to
missmatching behavior with each re-evaluation. This behavior can obviously be adapted
to ones current domain. If one instead desires a constant sensibility to missmatches, one
could simply add a constant factor upon each reconsideration. The general approach is
summarized in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code for the Switching strategy
Require: Models M
Require: Initial threshold γ
Require: Observations O
1: curModel ← selectSimplest(M)
2: accumulatedSurprise ← 0
3: currentEpisode ← []
4: for all action in O do
5: currentEpisode.append(action)
6: surprise ← curModel.computeSurprise(action)
7: accumulatedSurprise ← accumulatedSurprise + surprise
8: if accumulatedSurprise > γ then
9: curModel ← chooseNextModel(M, currentEpisode)
10: γ ← γ ∗ 1.5
11: end if
12: end for
All five different models are visualized in Figures 7 and 8. The (simplified) BToM models
only really differ from each other in the number of mental states that they are actively
evaluating. The Switching model can be considered as a meta-model, which uses the other
simplified models adaptively.
While we will present our results based on this very naive approach, we will discuss a
range of promising modifications to this strategy in section 7 below.
5.4 Surprise Measurements
The switching approach outlined above requires us to evaluate an action or a sequence of
actions regarding how well they match our models’ predictions. As we mentioned above, we
consider mismatches to be surprising. We chose this, as it has been found that humans tend
to start a re-evaluation process upon being surprised (Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl,
1997), which is a process we imitate here. However, it is not clear how to model surprise
in artificial systems. There has been a range of different suggestions as to what a surprise
measure could look like (Macedo, Reisezein, & Cardoso, 2004; Itti & Baldi, 2009).
Arguably the simplest surprise measure when probabilistic action predictions are given
is to just take the negative log-likelihood of the observed actions:
S1(a) = −log(P (a)) (14)
or when considering a sequence at = a1, .., at of actions:
S1(a1, .., at) =
t∑
i=1
−log(P (ai)) (15)
The log-likelihood is a common quality measure for probabilistic models and also known
as the self-information in information theory. Furthermore, it actually emerges naturally as
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Figure 7: Visualization of the Full BToM (top left), the TWG (top right), the TW (bottom
left) and the TG (bottom right) models. The circles represent random variables that are
considered by the models. Grayed out circles are clamped to a certain belief (the true belief
except for the TG model where it is b′w) so that not all possibilities are considered.
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Decide
Figure 8: Visualization of the Switching model. Only one of the specialized models is active
at any time. The Decide process first determines whether or not the current model needs
to be re-evaluated and if so will choose the next most suitable model.
a special case of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the observation distribution
Q(a) and the predictive distribution P (a), as long as one assumes perfect observation, such
that Q(a) = 1, iff a is the actually observed action:
S′1(a) = KL(Q(a)||P (a)) =
∑
Q(a) log(
Q(a)
P (a)
) (16)
While this measure has many nice properties, it also comes with its own problems that
limits its use as a surprise measure: Since S1 only looks at the self-information of the actually
observed actions, it will punish actions that have equally likely alternatives. In any situation
where there is more than one optimal action, P (a) will at most be 0.5, resulting in fairly
large surprise values from S1 even though the action has been one of the optimal ones. This
is especially detrimental in open environments such as Maze 5, where numerous equally good
alternative paths towards any given goal exist.
In order to combat this trend, we consider a second surprise measure in this paper which
has been used in (Macedo et al., 2004) to explain human empirical data:
Instead of simply considering the log-likelihood, this measure considers the difference
between the observed action’s likelihood P (a) and the probability of the most likely action
according to the model Pmax:
S2(a) = log(1 + Pmax − P (a)) (17)
This way, only actions that actually deviate from the predicted behavior are considered
surprising. However, from a computational standpoint, this measure has the downside that
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it requires the computation of Pmax for each observed action, which is a lot more computa-
tionally expensive than the simple log-likelihood of S1.
We like to point out that, regardless of surprise measurement used, a model’s accumu-
lated surprise can never go down when observing new actions, as an action will at most not
produce any new surprise but never a negative surprise.
6. Results and Comparison of the Different Models
As introduced at the beginning of this paper, we are primarily interested in satisficing
mentalizing. Satisficing, accoding to Simon (Simon, 1955), is always a good enough trade-off
between optimality or accuracy and computational effort or time. What should be considered
good enough will change depending on any given situation. Therefore, we will compare the
different models regarding these two aspects making up satisficing systems, namely their
predictive accuracy as well as their computational costs in terms of time. To analyse this,
we have the models evaluate all of the 687 complete trajectories we collected in the study
described in Section 4. Furthermore, in order to better highlight how the models, and the
switching approach in particular, react to different human behavior, we will also present two
example trajectories in more detail.
Finally, we have presented two possible alternatives for the surprise measurement used
by the switching model. While these different measurements, change the way a model’s
predictions are interpreted and how “surprising” they are, we find that they make little
differences with respect to the relative comparison between the different models. Therefore,
in favor of better readability, we will primarily report our results using the negative log-
likelihood/S1 here, except for when the use of S2 produces a qualitative difference to the
model comparison. We used β = 1.5 and an initial threshold of γ = 20 for the Switching
model for all results reported here when using S1 and γ = 1.5 when using S2. A complete
report of all data for both surprise measurements as well as on a more detailed scope can be
found in (Pöppel, 2019) along access to the raw data and source code generating this data.
6.1 Predictive Accuracy
In order to determine the models’ predictive accuracy, we present here the negative log-
likelihood of the observed actions which corresponds to S1. Lower values correspond to
better predictions made by the models.
Table 3 summarizes the predictive performance of the different models in terms of their
average negative log-likelihood aggregated across all different mazes and variants.
The table shows that the Switching model outperforms all other models regardless of
condition.
Furthermore, we see that the specialized models outperform the Full BToM model in
their respective conditions, except for the TW model. However, as can be seen in Table 7,
when considering which model performed better more often in the Destination Uncertainty
condition, the TW model comes out ahead of the Full BToM model.
We also notice fairly large standard deviations of the same order of magnitude of the
mean. Considering the different mazes and their variants separately reveals strong differences
between them. A complete breakdown of all 6 mazes with both variants can be found in
(Pöppel, 2019) and Table 4 shows these results for Maze 2, Variant 1.
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Model Overall NU DU PU
Full BToM Model 43.6975 (41.98) 29.1360 (11.04) 48.8868 (38.29) 53.1374 (58.02)
TWG Model 47.8146 (59.76) 13.8305 (12.54) 75.3903 (56.71) 54.5828 (73.36)
TW Model 49.0316 (44.56) 32.9640 (13.26) 50.8797 (39.45) 63.2752 (61.28)
TG Model 45.6111 (51.67) 22.8657 (15.75) 72.0591 (47.27) 42.2535 (65.58)
Switching Model 34.1854 (46.29) 13.0823 (10.38) 48.7999 (40.96) 40.8646 (62.75)
Table 3: Average negative log-likelihood values (equivalent to S1) for the different models
aggregated over all trajectories for the different conditions and their standard deviations.
Model Overall NU DU PU
Full BToM Model 25.7049 (12.72) 19.9803 (8.37) 34.1020 (13.91) 22.2687 (9.72)
TWG Model 27.5364 (28.37) 11.7580 (11.44) 52.8175 (30.20) 15.3185 (15.53)
TW Model 27.1198 (12.49) 21.6264 (8.72) 34.6279 (13.27) 24.5295 (10.74)
TG Model 27.2539 (29.00) 10.5356 (8.60) 55.5476 (30.31) 12.3713 (10.86)
Switching Model 19.4609 (15.78) 10.7026 (8.23) 32.8789 (15.85) 13.4700 (10.65)
Table 4: Average surprise score according to S1 for the different models aggregated over all
trajectories in Maze 2, Variant 1.
In this maze, the TG model performs best in both the No Uncertainty and the Path
Uncertainty conditions, even marginally better than the Switching model.
6.1.1 Pairwise Model Comparison
Because of the fairly large standard deviations found in Table 3 and the dependence of the
maze as seen in Table 4, we also looked at a head-to-head comparison of the different models.
For each trajectory within our data, we compared each model against all other models,
counting which achieved a lower or equal surprise value. Aggregating over the different
mazes and/or conditions, this gives us the relative frequency of how often any particular
model outperforms (or at least performs just as good as) another in that setting. Table
5 contains these results aggregated over all mazes and conditions, thus this is comparable
to the Overall column of Table 3. Using the S2 surprise measurement, the overall picture
remains the same. Only the Full BToM and the TW models benefit slightly from S2, as
considering different alternatives is not punished, as can be seen in Table 6. The Switching
model clearly outperforms any other model regardless of condition or surprise measure used.
Note that the percentages of the Switching model winning and losing against other models
may add up to more than 100%. These include the cases where the Switching model performs
the same as another model, as we are counting less or equal surprise values. The switching
model’s surprise will be identical to the other models if the final model it ends up switching
to is the other model.
Table 3 suggested that the Full BToM model outperforms the TW model in the Des-
tination Uncertainty condition. However, looking at the relative wins for the Destination
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Full BToM TWG TW TG Switching
Full BToM – 38.86 % 66.96 % 44.1 % 15.14 %
TWG 61.14 % – 65.36 % 52.84 % 49.93 %
TW 33.04 % 34.64 % – 40.32 % 33.19 %
TG 55.9 % 47.89 % 59.68 % – 36.68 %
Switching 84.86 % 96.51 % 99.13 % 85.3 % –
Table 5: Average frequency of the model on the left achieving a lower S1 surprise measure
than the model on the top across all trajectories.
Full BToM TWG TW TG Switching
Full BToM – 54.59 % 66.23 % 53.86 % 27.22 %
TWG 45.41 % – 54 % 48.76 % 37.99 %
TW 33.77 % 46 % – 48.47 % 41.34 %
TG 46.14 % 51.24 % 51.53 % – 33.62 %
Switching 72.78 % 98.69 % 96.8 % 91.56 % –
Table 6: Average frequency of the model on the left achieving a lower S2 surprise measure
than the model on the top across all trajectories.
Uncertainty condition in more detail (Table 7), we actually find a slightly different result
compared to column DU from Table 3:
The TW model actually has a better accuracy in slightly over 58% of the trajectories
in the Destination Uncertainty condition. The better surprise score shown in Table 3 can
be understood by taking into account how much worse a model performs in case it looses.
Whenever the TW model looses against the Full BToM model, it performs a lot worse than
when the Full BToM model looses against it.
6.2 Computational Efficiency
The second aspect for satisficing mentalizing is concerned with the computational costs of
the different models. All models were implemented in the same way in Python using the
Full BToM TWG TW TG Switching
Full BToM – 81.94 % 41.85 % 87.22 % 30.84 %
TWG 18.06 % – 19.38 % 58.15 % 18.5 %
TW 58.15 % 80.62 % – 85.02 % 85.02 %
TG 12.78 % 42.29 % 14.98 % – 11.45 %
Switching 69.16 % 92.95 % 98.24 % 94.27 % –
Table 7: Average frequency of the model on the left achieving a lower S1 surprise measure
than the model on the top across all trajectories of the Destination Uncertainty condition.
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same underlying data structure for the maze and the behavioral data. The only differences
between the different models arise from the different mental states that need to be considered
for the different models resulting in slightly different likelihoods, most notably in the use
of the actual distance versus the assumed distance according to the freespace assumption
when considering the world belief. The switching models makes use of the specialized models
unmodified.
The models not using the freespace assumption can improve their computational costs by
caching the exact distances after computing them once for any given start and end position.
As the assumed distance under the freespace assumption does not only depend on the start
and end position, but also on the already seen grids in the world of that trajectory, caching is
not as straight forward. In order to make the comparison more fair, we reset the cache after
every trajectory, meaning that the models can at most benefit from it when a trajectory
revisits an earlier position, for the results reported below.
We measured the wall-time of all models for all trajectories and computed the averages
across the different conditions as well as overall, similar to our accuracy scores above. Table
8 presents the results of this using S1 on a 3.5Ghz Xeon machine using Python 3.6.8.
Model Overall NU DU PU
Full BToM 33.2227 (11.12) 32.7581 (11.84) 33.2447 (10.57) 33.4961 (11.22)
TWG 1.2039 (1.04) 1.4691 (1.02) 1.1319 (1.06) 1.1135 (1.01)
TW 1.4990 (1.08) 1.7792 (1.06) 1.4225 (1.09) 1.4040 (1.05)
TG 1.3669 (1.53) 1.3323 (0.48) 1.3765 (2.35) 1.3784 (0.49)
Switching 2.6036 (10.91) 1.8045 (4.75) 3.0151 (12.12) 2.6617 (12.21)
Table 8: Absolute average timings and their standard deviations (in ms) for the different
models and conditions when using S1.
The models are ordered as expected from the least complex TWG model taking the
least amount of time to the Full BToM model being orders of magnitude slower. Due to
the freespace assumption the TG model actually considers less mental states than the TW
model, which results in slightly better wall times.
In order to better highlight the differences we normalized these times by dividing them
by the times of the quickest model (usually the TWG model, except for the No Uncer-
tainty condition using S1). These relative times are reported in Table 9. We also included
the relative timings using the S2 measurement here to show the relative differences. All
models except the Full BToM model are influenced in a similar way by the more complex
computations involved in S2. The Full BToM model, however, suffers noticeably more.
The relative timings clearly show the different computational complexities for the dif-
ferent models with the specialized models being more efficient than the more general Full
BToM and the Switching model. The Switching model is however an order of magnitude
more efficient than the Full BToM model, despite the very naive re-evaluation strategy
currently employed.
Since the time for the Switching model heavily depends on the number of re-evaluations,
due to the naivety of our initial approach, we also report the average number of re-evaluations
when using S1 for all variations in our data in Table 10. Here we find that the No Uncertainty
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Model Overall NU DU PU Overall S2 NU S2 DU S2 PU S2
Full BToM 27.60 24.59 29.37 30.08 61.39 49.43 66.07 66.36
TWG 1.00 1.10 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TW 1.25 1.34 1.26 1.26 1.63 1.52 1.68 1.69
TG 1.14 1.00 1.22 1.24 2.53 2.03 2.73 2.73
Switching 2.16 1.35 2.66 2.39 4.40 2.04 5.50 5.17
Table 9: Relative times of the different models using S1 and S2, normalized to the quickest
model.
NU DU PU
Maze V1 V2 V1 V2 V1 V2
1 0.087 0.136 1.75 1.476 2.5 0.722
2 0.167 0.000 1.722 2.762 0.357 0.905
3 1.133 0.174 3.167 2.65 2.938 2.818
4 0.000 0.200 2.692 3.778 2.16 1.821
5 0.235 0.053 1.933 2.12 0.75 0.238
6 1.000 0.409 2.75 2.091 2.571 1.357
Table 10: Relative number of re-evaluations performed by the switching model across the
different mazes and conditions using S1 with an initial threshold of 20.
condition unsurprisingly causes the least amount of re-evaluations as the Switching model
can usually stick to its initial TWG model. In the other conditions, we find that the
number of re-evaluation is dependent on the maze. In particular the length of the optimal
trajectory (which is longest for Maze 1,3 and 4) influences the number of re-evaluation which
is understandable, when considering that S1 will almost always increase due to how it is
computed. Maze 6 is comparatively speaking shorter in terms of optimal distance, however
it appears to be more tricky for participants (cf. average distance in Table 2), resulting in
the Switching model to have to re-evaluate more often as well.
6.3 Exemplary Model Traces
To demonstrate how the models (the proposed Switching model in particular) react to the
different observations during a particular trajectory.
Figure 9 shows two example trajectories, one from the Destination Uncertainty condition
in Maze 3 (left side of 9a) and one from the Path Uncertainty condition in Maze 6 (right side).
In Figure 9b we present the models scores across the different steps within the trajectories.
These scores correspond to the negative log-likelihood (S1). For the left image, we see that
the Switching model quickly switches to the TW model at step 34 and sticks to it as it
explains the behavior best. The Full BToM model however, can explain the behavior even
better in terms of S1 primarily due to a better start in the first 10 steps. For the right image
(the Path Uncertainty condition), the Switching model correctly switches to the TG model
at step 21.
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The plots in Figure 9c show how certain the different models are regarding the inferred
mental states. We computed the entropy for all three mental states (desire, goal belief
and world belief) and averaged them after each step. Obviously the Full BToM model has
a strong disadvantage here, as it considers the most mental states. The initial difference
between the TW and TG model comes from the fact that our simplification using the
freespace assumption results in the TG model to only consider desires, whereas the TW
model additionally considers the goal beliefs with 24 different outcomes. The plots show
that the Full BToM and TW models only really improve their entropy upon seeing any of
the exits since they cannot rule out any world before that. For the Destination Uncertainty
condition example on the left, we find that the Full BToM and the TW models can actually
reduce their entropy to zero after seeing the 3rd exit at step 91 and then moving away from
it, as they will be certain about the world they are in at that point. When they do not see
all exits, as in the Path Uncertainty example on the right, both models will not be able to
eliminate their uncertainties. They will not even be able to make desire predictions until
they observe the agent seeing the final exit and walking towards it (around step 68).
7. Discussion
The contributions of this paper are twofold: First of all, we want to draw attention to
the benefits and deficits of BToM models of varying complexity. Our results clearly show
that specialized and simpler models are usually better at predicting an agent’s behavior
compared to more complex models, as long as the models assumptions are not violated.
The more flexible and powerful Full BToM model has too much flexibility. For large parts
of a behavior, it will not be able to make confident predictions as it will not be able to rule
out certain combinations of desires and mental states, making almost any action equally
likely (cf. Figure 9c). On the other hand, the simpler models are able to make predictions
more easily, as they do not consider as many possibilities due to their discrete assumptions
regarding certain mental states. When these assumptions are violated, we unsurprisingly
find that these models perform a lot more poorly. These findings highlight, on the one hand
side, that specialized models for very specific scenarios will not suffice for artificial systems
trying to interact with humans. On the other hand side, however, a general, all-encompassing
model will most likely also not be able to yield satisfying results. While a general model will
rarely make wrong predictions or inferences, it will likewise not make any strong predictions
either, reducing its usefulness for many scenarios. We have also found that humans tend to
be rather quick at making discrete inferences, when not primed to consider multiple possible
alternatives (Pöppel & Kopp, view). Human evolution may also favour stronger predictions
and inferences, which may further explain the emergence of heuristics in human reasoning
(Lieder & Griffiths, 2019; Haselton et al., 2015).
On top of these accuracy considerations, our results also show the well known compu-
tational complexity inherent in Bayesian models. The Full BToM model can be considered
as a combination of the TW and TG model, but its complexity rises exponentially, even in
our simple discrete 2D domain. This results in the Full BToM model are orders of magni-
tude slower than the specialized models, especially, when compared to the simplest model,
which by itself already predicts an agent’s next actions fairly well. While one can combat
this exponential explosion using approximate inference methods, this always introduces a
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(a) Example trajectory in the DU condition in Maze 3 (left) and the PU condition in Maze 6 (right).
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(b) Negative log likelihood (S1) over steps for the different models for the trajectories shown in 9a.
Vertical lines indicate re-evaluations by the Switching model.
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(c) Averaged entropy across the three considered mental states for the different models.
Figure 9: Example trajectories 9a and the corresponding output of the different models:
9b action predictions, 9c entropy of inferred mental states. Left: Destination Uncertainty
condition; right: Path Uncertainty condition
26
Satisficing Mentalizing
different trade-off between accuracy and speed. Furthermore, while the benefits of approxi-
mate methods will not apply linearly to all models, the simpler models will also benefit from
them. As such we see approximate methods as an alternative approach towards satisficing
mentalizing compared to our proposed Switching model, which is the focus of the second
contribution of this paper:
While very simple, the proposed switching approach combines the benefits of the spe-
cialized models and the flexibility of the Full BToM model. Similar to the egocentric bias in
humans (Keysar, 2007), the Switching approach will initially project its own knowledge onto
the agent, thus using the simplest model of only inferring the other’s desire. Only when it
encounters counter-evidence against its current model choice, will it reconsider and switch
to a more appropriate model. This approach was inspired by the processing steps found
in humans upon encountering surprising events (Meyer et al., 1997). Even with our very
naive re-evaluation strategy, we already outperform all other models in terms of predictive
accuracy, since for all conditions, it can make use of the most appropriate model, even if the
human behavior may deviate from what would be considered the norm for that condition.
The findings in Table 4 where the TG model outperforms the Switching approach in two
conditions indicates that our meta parameters (primarily γ in this case) can still be opti-
mized further, when one strives for the best accuracy, however lower γ would lead to more
re-evaluations and thus worse efficiency.
At the same time it remains at least an order of magnitude quicker than the Full BToM
model since it can keep the number of re-evaluations down while never considering a model
as complex as the Full BToM model. Another benefit of the Switching approach with
regard to satisficing mentalizing is its potential adaptivity. Satisficing is all about being
good enough, however this is not a static quantity. What is good enough will always depend
on the individual situation and will be influenced by a range of different factors, such as
available resources or one’s current mental state. Any number of such factors can easily be
incorporated into the Switching approach by adapting the threshold for the re-evaluation
appropriately. Possible factors an artificial system could take into account involve the current
trade-off between accuracy and speed, learned success of available models in past encounters,
and/or the cost of actually performing the re-evaluation - something we are currently looking
into in ongoing work. Furthermore, one can not only adapt the point in time when a re-
evaluation should happen, but also how it should happen. Currently, we naively evaluate
all possible models, an approach not really suitable once the number of considered models
increases. However, one could also imagine a hierarchical re-evaluation mechanism which
has been learned and adapted over time. Finally, the Switching approach can easily be
extended online by adding new specialized models to the pool of considered models. This is
similar to the learning of heuristics in humans (Lieder & Griffiths, 2019).
A third aspect we want to highlight in this paper is the need to evaluate mentalizing
models on actual human behavior data. Human behavior can deviate quite strongly from
the behavior assumed to be the norm given a specific situation. In our data, we not only
found behavior in the Path Uncertainty condition being very similar to the No Uncertainty
condition on certain mazes, but also found behavior in the Destination Uncertainty condition
that can not be explained by the assumed mental states of that condition.
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8. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a Switching strategy as an alternative to a Full Bayesian
Theory of Mind model to perform mentalizing in scenarios where the observed agents may
have a range of different mental states. The Switching strategy proposes the use of special-
ized models, designed to handle different mental potential mental states in isolation, but
only consider one of these models at any given time, switching between them as appropriate,
similar to the use of different learned heuristics in humans (Lieder & Griffiths, 2019). We
use a measurement of surprise to make this decision, modelled after the adaptive processes
in humans upon encountering unexpected or surprising events (Meyer et al., 1997).
We evaluated our proposed approach not as commonly done via correlations with human
judgements on synthetic data but rather their predictive accuracy on actual human behavior
data, which we collected in a study where we manipulated the available information partic-
ipants had to work with. While comparing ToM models with human ratings is important,
we believe that looking at actual human data and considering predictive performance should
not be neglected. After all one can argue that the actual inferred mental state may not mat-
ter as long as the resulting behavior of the system remains optimal (Pynadath & Marsella,
2007). Our results show not only that specialized models can outperform more complex
ones in situations where their assumptions are valid, but also that our proposed Switching
approach can outperform a general BToM model in terms of both predictive accuracy as
well as computational complexity. The benefits of stronger predictive power as well as lower
computational costs of specialized models can be employed across different scenarios. A
more complex model is only used when required, which is especially useful at the beginning
of the behavior, where more complex models cannot rule out many of their possibilities.
Furthermore, while we did not evaluate different switching thresholds and re-evaluation
strategies in this paper, we believe that the general approach is a good step towards sat-
isficing mentalizing for artificial systems. We do believe that the current reconsideration
strategy needs improvement, as evaluating all specialized models will not scale to more com-
plex scenarios with more of these models. Apart from learning a separate model which will
predict the most useful model, once could also consider only evaluating the different models
at a subset of the seen behavior, determined by which actions have been surprising before.
Another alternative may be a predetermined hierarchy of models which is evaluated in the
hierarchical order. Regardless of the final strategy, the easy inclusion of adaptive thresholds
and/or dynamic re-evaluation strategies allows this approach to yield results that are good
enough for a given situation, while conforming to computational constraints.
While sampling may also serve to reduce the computational demands of BToM models
and may even be useful to mirror human fallacies (Vul et al., 2014), we see our approach
as an alternative. In fact, depending on the employed switching strategy and considered
specialized models, one can formulate the Switching approach as a sampling strategy when
one re-samples discrete mental states within the Full BToM model. However, in this case,
one needs to find a way to update the prior probabilities for the different mental states
according to the observations efficiently. We are currently exploring some ways of how
this could be achieved in ongoing work (e.g. (Pöppel & Kopp, view)). Another important
avenue of improving this approach is by allowing for dynamic learning of specialized models.
Currently, all considered models need to be specified a priori as in the BToM framework.
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Ideally, the system would realize when none of its models can explain the observed behavior
to a satisfying degree and start adapting existing models as well as creating new ones.
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